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Beyond its Whitewashed Past, the 
Unique Peoples of Precolonial Kenya
Anne-Marie Peatrik
Translated by Jane Womack & Sara Doel
Twenty years have elapsed since the first edition of Kenya contemporain 
(Grignon & Prunier 1998), even more if we refer to the point at which the 
authors wrote their respective contributions. The last chapter of the edited 
volume (Grignon 1998) on the “democratic invention,” for instance, was an 
attempt at determining what the effects of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
new multi-party system were on political life. Obviously, since then, Kenya, 
like the rest of the world, has changed in this area, as in many others.
Taking stock of change is not as simple with regard to the topic to which 
we are paying particular attention here, namely the peoples and cultures or 
civilisations before the conquest of what was to become Kenya, as well as 
the advances in knowledge pertaining to them during those two decades. 
In this regard, the chapter on “Les sociétés anciennes et leur héritage” 
(“Ancient Societies and their Heritage”) drafted by myself (Peatrik 1998) 
stands up reasonably well but the idea of “heritage” which underpinned 
a number of developments needs revisiting. “Heritage,” defined as the 
implicit or deliberate transmission and reception of ways of acting and 
thinking which leave their mark on contemporary practices, is no longer 
understood in the same way in Kenya: the quite different notion of 
“heritagisation” (or “heritage-making”) of culture has taken its place. This 
reappraisal of the status of the peoples and of their “customs,” and the new 
anthropological theory on which it is based, is arguably the real intellectual 
innovation which came from those decades. Before getting to the heart of 
our topic, it is important to highlight these shifts as they shape the way 
in which knowledge of the populations under discussion is presented and 
disseminated, and more immediately, the content of this article.
1. How Current Events Affect Knowledge
The move towards freedom of speech and the freedom to broach a wide 
range of topics within everyday conversation and across various media, 
magnified by the availability of digital technologies, has undoubtedly led to 
introduce questions about “culture” within the public debate which would 
have been previously impossible or unthinkable to address in Kenya.
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One must remember the reticence and self-censorship that existed in 
the shadow of a culture of informing, which restricted exchanges and 
conversations under Daniel arap Moi’s presidency (1978–2002) until the 
early 1990s. Customs, music and “traditional” clothing, which are in many 
ways harmless practices, were no exception: it was impossible to refer to 
them, let alone reclaim them at the risk of being labelled anti-modern, 
backward and even unpatriotic. The author of this text, who carried out 
research among the Meru from 1986 to 1993 on their ancient (and highly 
original) traditional political system, well remembers the initial disapproval, 
refusal to speak or even disbelief of the people she spoke to. Kenyans were 
educated, modern, properly dressed, they said, adding that all these customs 
of yesteryear were long gone and only pastoralists from the semi-desert 
regions and their herds would cling on to these retrograde practices. The 
popularity of the Maasai was then at its height among tourists (foreigners, 
needless to say) and many incredulous Kenyans questioned what image these 
warriors with their braided hair, bodies covered in ochre and armed with 
spears were conveying about their country. The only belated concession to 
the tradition and to the Africanness it represented was made by Moi, who, 
ready to make concessions in order to counter claims of multi-partyism, 
began extolling the virtues of committees of elders, whether revived, or 
self-appointed without foundation, since they had been brushed aside for 
so long. The “reinvented tradition” (Ranger 1983) was thus reimagined for 
the purposes of political control: few were fooled by the U-turn performed 
by the skilful tyrant, but the move delighted certain local baronets for 
whom it was too good an opportunity to miss.1
A quarter of a century later, the shift is evident. There is no city, no 
village anywhere in Kenya where you cannot find at least one “cultural 
dance” group, approved, if possible, by the County committee2; no market 
where you cannot find signs promoting local plants and medicines or a little 
1. At the very beginning of the 1990s, the Njuri Ncheke, at that time in 
decline, re-emerged among the Meru (Peatrik 1999: 455-470, 2020 [2019]: 372-
384): President Moi saw them as a model council of elders and encouraged 
that such councils be (re)instated elsewhere in Kenya. Within the framework 
of the Organisation of African Unity, until 2011 these councils were financed 
by Muammar Gaddafi, the “King of Kings,” who considered them to be better 
suited to managing populations than Western-inspired structures. This period 
in which traditional councils were manipulated to thwart multi-partyism, and 
which resumed the practices of the colonial administration under a different 
guise, is still in need of specialist research. Some elements can be found in 
Nyamweru & Chidongo (2018).
2. Since the reform of 2010, the county has replaced the district (an administrative 
division equivalent to the French department) and is governed locally by a 
county assembly which is elected by universal suffrage.
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private museum that an elderly person will be delighted to show you around. 
During public meetings, the governing elites break into isukuti steps—a 
very popular dance originating from the West of Kenya (Kiiru 2014)—to 
break up the meeting, casually don shirts with “African” designs on, and 
their wives no longer think twice about draping themselves in billowing 
brown dresses decorated with braids, reminiscent of the clothes of their 
ancestors, made from tanned and softened hides, adorned with pearls and 
cowry shells. Could it be the fallout from the years of policies encouraging 
cultural diversity to stave off fratricidal ethnic rivalries, particularly the 
post-election violence of 2007–2008?
Or could it be the intensive heritagisation programmes funded by 
Unesco and relayed through local campaigns and NGOs who see it as a 
resource for tourism and potential development? And what about the 
YouTube videos and countless websites promoting one “ethnic group” or 
another, and the use of local languages? Never before has cultural diversity 
and the ethnic brand associated with it been as promoted or lauded as it 
is in Kenya today. To the extent that the ethnographer must now contend 
with interviewees who are too keen to allow their culture to be studied and 
mirrored back to them.
How are we to understand it when Kenyans now speak of “culture,” 
that is, as an understatement or euphemism for what they used to call 
customs or traditions? Are they praising the idea of returning to a frugal, 
ecological way of life which nonetheless incorporates cars, mobile phones, 
electricity and running water? Are they championing the values of respect 
and solidarity even though they are now being divorced from the practices 
which instilled them, such as gruelling initiations, public male and female 
circumcision, or even restrictive rules like the “bride price3” that was paid 
to secure marriages and determine the parents of children yet to be born? 
Do they want a return to the funerals of the past, during which, so as to 
not pollute the soils, the remains of the deceased were left in the bush for 
the hyenas and vultures, and grief was relieved through ritual coitus, for 
fear that the stain of death would otherwise endure? What should we say 
about “pagan” ceremonies (to use the missionaries’ term), which are a far 
cry from various festivities that exist today where just a few animals are 
sacrificed? And about cultural dances whose choreography draws freely 
3. “Bride price” or “bride wealth” was paid in kind and/or in cash by the future 
husband (usually with help from his family) to guarantee the status of any 
future children by the woman, his future wife, who would leave her family 
of origin to set up home with their husband and start their own family. This 
transaction and social contract are often confused in both French and English 
with the “dowry” which refers to the material goods that a woman brings with 
her to her new family. The two transactions can co-exist but do not in any way 
follow the same logic. 
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from those rituals, with the sequences which seem inappropriate or out 
of place removed? As for witchcraft, that paragon of past customs, what 
should we make of the fact that the way in which it spreads and feeds 
rumours turns out to be closely linked with modernity (Middleton 1963; 
Luongo 2011)?
It appears that in Kenya, culture, customs and traditions cover a broad 
spectrum of meanings, ranging from the quest for identity in a post-colonial 
context to membership of clientelist networks or self-defence groups; from 
an imaginative space from which creative inspiration can be drawn, to 
stereotypes which can promote folklore-influenced brands or breed ethnic 
violence; or even knowledge and straightforward skills passed down by a 
parent to implicit ways of categorising which are conveyed through use of 
the mother tongue. We must not overlook geographical patterns, ways of 
roaming the land, the fact of staying in certain sites more than others, ways 
of perceiving the landscape, and associated land and property claims.4
To illustrate this abundance of meanings, conducive as it is to syncretism 
and a mish-mash of ideology, let us consider the astonishing movement 
called, “The Multitude” or Mûngiki (from the verb kwonga, meaning to 
multiply). This is the name of a generation of reinvented traditionalists, 
among them a small number of young Kikuyu who joined in the 1980s 
at the time of the first ethnic conflict and formed self-defence groups. 
Aimed at young men faced with unemployment and low achievement, 
these Mûngiki activists, who also called themselves heirs of the Mau 
Mau uprising (which, we must remember, led to independence in 1963), 
advocated a return to family “traditions” and to the ancient practice of 
passing official powers down through traditional generations.5 This young 
Multitude, in search of neo-patriarchal models and practices (Maupeu 
2003; Lafargue 2010), even if they failed to rally anyone beyond their 
accomplices, still managed to frighten the middle classes, both Kikuyu and 
Kenyan, and those within powerful circles.
Yet all of this is a very long way from what the ante-colonial populations 
referred to using the ethnonym kikuyu, or by any other ethnonym. More 
than a century has passed since the military conquest, longer than that if we 
4. In short, a civilisational process which anthropological scholars have 
incorporated into the notions of ethos or habitus, and have set about 
deconstructing across many analytical fields such as kinship, powers, modes of 
production, rites and religion, beliefs and knowledge… The collection recently 
published under the direction of Hughes & Lamont (2018) which addresses the 
way in which 2010 constitution promoted culture to the status of “cultural 
rights” puts forward interesting avenues. 
5. The subject of traditional generational classes is explained in the section 4, 
p. 363.
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refer to the arrival of missionaries in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
This has been a century and a half of major transformation across Africa and 
the world, over the course of which traditional institutions and ancestral 
practices, themselves shaped by a unique history, have been continuously 
put to the test.
Whilst in recent years, knowledge of the history of contemporary Africa 
has grown considerably, supported by an increasing number of written 
sources which are at last available—consider for example the reappraisal of 
the Mau Mau uprising (Ogot 2005; Charton 2011) or research into writing in 
African languages in Kenya (Peterson 2004; MacArthur 2016)—, knowledge 
of the societies and cultures that really existed prior to the conquests has 
progressed very little, with a few exceptions. The crisis affecting Kenyan 
national museums is proof of this. The prestigious site is now a sad thing 
to behold, after the reform of 2006 which resulted in the ethnographic 
galleries at the Nairobi National Museum being closed6—they were judged 
to be “colonialist” but were a mine of information about ancient societies 
and customs—and in devolved responsibilities to counties who were 
supposed to revive the national museums locally. Apart from a few well-
equipped rooms, one wanders past mostly empty, dusty display cabinets, 
with a few photos and several plaques which make up the temporary 
exhibitions that are always there. And the groups of schoolchildren who go 
for extracurricular visits hardly make up for the sluggish visitor numbers. 
A new national museum of ethnography and history of peoples and past 
civilisations is still looking for its creators in Kenya, as is also the case in 
other African countries.
Unravelling Africa’s distant past presents a number of methodological 
difficulties (Spear 1981; Sutton 1990). Written sources remain limited 
and oral traditions have a specific relevance but their analysis requires 
precaution. Regarding the history of languages, it is difficult to come up 
with reference points that are easy to use. Ethnographical data is poorly 
mobilised and historiography lacks reflexivity. As for archaeological digs, 
they are insufficient: they are costly and seen as less prestigious than research 
into hominisation and early man by the academic world and by financers, 
thus attracting fewer researchers even though there are many sites listed. 
In Kenya, according to the accounts of researchers at the national museum, 
6. The superb Kikuyu hut which demonstrated the skill of traditional builders 
and was located outside was also destroyed, on the pretext that it perpetuated the 
confusion between national identity and Kikuyu identity… At the same time, the 
open-air Bomas of Kenya museum on the edge of the Nairobi National Park, where 
the national dance company is based and habitats (“bomas”) which represent 
national diversity have been built, has not undergone any specific renovation 
even though its more national character would make this highly worthwhile.
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working on 1,000,000 year old history potentially offers more prestige 
and credibility than that which dates back 10,000, 5,000 or 1,000 years BP. 
And yet it is during these last millennia that key elements of the historical 
framework of today’s East Africans have fallen into place (Lane 2016). Very 
recently, a few studies have been carried out on the history of ecosystems 
linked to the climate crisis and the question of preserving natural heritage. 
Similarly, progress has been made in settlement history thanks to the rise of 
population genetics but the major socio-human frameworks are still rarely 
questioned. Highland societies are still considered to be limited in their 
historical richness. This is of course contrary to the cities of the Swahili 
Corridor which left behind “traces” and accounts that are more in keeping 
with the conventional tools of historical and archaeological research.
In the absence of debate around these areas, while the cultural heritage 
craze is in full swing, the gap between the knowledge of contemporary 
East Africa and the East Africa of the past is widening. One must, 
supported by specific knowledge, be increasingly imaginative in avoiding 
anachronisms and capturing the unique spaces and peoples of East Africa. 
How long will it take for intellectuals and the educated elite to realise 
that the institutions and practices which underpin “customs” are born of 
a history that is social, political, religious, aesthetic, demographic, which 
pertains to heterogeneous timescales (emic and etic) and which should 
be investigated? This is the way things happen in science and knowledge 
production. As soon as there is evidence of a social and political expectation 
regarding these questions, coming from the new generation, the academic 
momentum and stewardship will follow.
The overview presented below is based on field research and monographs 
carried out in the twentieth  century, at a time when witnesses and 
participants from before the conquest were still able to provide first-hand 
information. Ethnographic in its content, this broad portrait aims to draw 
out the original characters from unique worlds, which have undergone 
profound change but whose influence can be found in a number of ways in 
the present-day reality.7
2. A Unique Geography and Economy
Who and which peoples from the time before colonial borders were created 
are we talking about? In what became Kenya, the smallest populations and 
groupings, wherever they were located, were often identified by proper 
names which are rarely used and are not well known today. According 
7. It is impossible to detail the countless references which support this overview. 
At the end of the article, the selected biography suggests further reading and 
provides links to further references.
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to whether these peoples named themselves or other people named them, 
they had changing ethnonyms. And many contemporary names, which 
seem to carry the hallmark of antiquity, are as much the product of tenuous 
transcriptions and opposing representations as they are of the improvised 
way the colonial administration was implemented.
The Meru ethnonym was coined in 1908 by the conqueror and first 
administrator of the area, derived from a Maasai name, which also appears 
to echo a toponym of the place where the first administrative and military 
post was established. In reality, at least five groups came under the label 
“Meru”: the Igembe, Mwiko jwa Ngaa (still called Tigania), Imenti, Chuka, 
Tharaka. The “Kikuyu” ethnonym was reappropriated in the 1930s to 
embrace all the people living between the northeast and southwest, and 
west of Mount Kenya—Meru, Embu, Mbeere, Gichugu, Ndia, Gaki, Metume, 
Karura—all of whom came under the single “Kikuyu Land Unit” by the 
colonial administration.
The Samburu, herders from North Kenya, known by this name of Bantu 
and/or Maasai origin, call themselves Lokop, an ethnonym that only they 
use. Further west towards Mount Elgon and Nyanza, the name (Aba-)Luyia 
incorporates, in simple terms, the Vugusu, Hayo, Marach, Wanga, Nyala, 
Tsotso, Marama, Holo, Isuxa, Idaxo, Kisa, Nyole, Logoli, Tiriki. Returning 
to the hinterland of the coast of the Indian Ocean, we find the Mijikenda 
(literally “the nine settlements”), an ethnonym that was coined in the 
1930s to distinguish it from the Swahili (also an exogenous ethnonym) and 
to replace their unflattering naming as “bushmen” (wanyika), bringing 
together nine different groups: Giriama, Jibana, Chonyi, Ribe, Kambe, 
Kauma, Rabai, Digo, Duruma.
The list is long. An interactive, multi-scalar map would best 
accommodate these ancient and contemporary onomastics. This would be 
a very solid introduction to the relativity and historicity of designations, 
which would look good in the entrance hall of a renovated and reinvented 
Kenyan national museum of ethnography and history, something which 
it is pleasing to imagine in this text. However, this does not mean these 
labile or arbitrary designations should be seen to reflect vague, ill-defined 
and unstructured communities, in line with another idea conceived in the 
minds of the first conquerors and administrators of these groups. Behind 
these names, or within them, there lie memberships and affiliations, 
rights and bans, solidarity and conflict, and also several limits—in sum, 
institutions, all without the use of writing or state bureaucracy, which it 
fell to anthropology and ethnography to decipher. Briefly, and without 
going into too much detail, the notion of “people” used here refers to the 
effectiveness of marking out political units which have been formed within 
or by the generational system (or traditional generations) and initiations—
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we will explain these two institutions later in the text. Otherwise, we are 
referring to more modest human groupings, which are expected over 
time either to expand or to merge or join together with more powerful 
neighbouring groups, or even disappear.
The highlands and lowlands of Kenya, like those of the border regions of 
neighbouring countries, are part of a unique environment made up of long, 
mostly gentle slopes, which are exposed to seasonal winds mainly coming 
from the Indian Ocean, bringing maritime influences and with them, rain. 
With the slopes acting as a shield against the humid winds, clouds form 
and rainfall increases in intensity in line with altitude as the temperature 
cools. And because these air masses come and go twice in the year, they 
trigger two rainy seasons (bimodal rainfall pattern) which allows for the 
possibility of two harvests, continuous lactation of herds and the regular 
production of beehives. The layering of ecosystems is another characteristic 
and additional benefit. Thermal gradient and humidity combine to produce 
environments that are versatile, according to altitude: lower down it is drier 
and suited to cereals and peas; at altitude it is cooler and more humid and 
suitable for roots, tubers, sugar cane, beans and bananas. Land at around 
1700 metres has (or had) many advantages conducive to human settlements: 
in an intermediate position and at a reasonable distance from those 
mentioned above, land at this altitude which is comparatively cool without 
being too cold, was unaffected by the anopheles (carriers of malaria) or by 
diseases that spread in hot and humid environments (lower morbidity).
However, this natural potential is limited by irregular rainfall. Such 
irregularity owes to the contrast between the well-watered slopes and 
the dryer leeward slopes, but also to the irregular rains from year to year, 
whether these are short rains in autumn or long rains in spring which can 
be insufficient, excessive, late or early. Current changes in the climate are, 
for the moment, only exacerbating this irregularity. There are a number 
of responses that people, over centuries and millennia, have learned to 
identify, to protect themselves and make the best use of this potential. 
The most sustainable of these was to have sufficiently large and varied 
land available and to practice a range of economic activities. Taking the 
opportunity to open gardens, graze a herd, hunt and forage for food in 
places where the rain is more abundant and moving to another slope or 
altitude without having to negotiate the move or the land’s ownership is the 
most appropriate response. The political drivers behind such a territorial 
arrangement are examined below.
Carrying out multiple economic activities in these spaces does not fit 
well with the portrayed image of the Maasai herdsmen, whose pastoral 
specialisation would have been a quintessential aspect of the traditional 
East African economy. Again, we must correct the stereotype that the 
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Maasai themselves often employ. This problematic and exceptional 
specialisation was probably a late decision in the history of these peoples, 
and the Maasai, although highly visible, are not very representative. The 
other peoples combined, to varying degrees and made up in many different 
ways, foraging and hunting, breeding (large and small ruminants, bees), 
agriculture (cereals, legumes, tubers, bananas, sugar cane), handmade items 
and bartering.
A wide range of items were made by hand, from the construction of various 
buildings (varying in size, life span and purpose) to the tanning of skins 
for clothing and bedding, as well as jewellery, ropemaking and containers: 
decorated gourds, wooden buckets sewn with leather, earthenware pots 
made by women during the cool and dry season, a period of plenty, 
conducive to feasts and rituals. Only the manufacturing of iron tools was 
carried out by specialists. Blacksmiths, who used pits for ore reduction, 
were craftsmen who were both feared and despised. These people and their 
activities were avoided and were subject to prohibitions. For example, they 
were not allowed to marry non-blacksmiths and a blacksmith’s wife could 
not practice farming, with the exception of small gardens within the family 
homestead. Blacksmith’s wives traded iron tools for agricultural goods, 
sometimes by means of force. Blacksmiths often owned large herds which 
had been amassed in exchange for their products, in particular essential 
weapons with which to equip the warrior classes.
The idea of “caste,” however, is inappropriate since these societies were 
non-hierarchical, egalitarian and by no means imbued with the ideology 
of purity. For both pragmatic and symbolic reasons, blacksmiths were 
considered to be abusive and ill-mannered. Since people could not do 
without them, it was best to protect oneself from them. But their Oolitic 
iron deposits were kept secret and guarded by warriors, as were some clay 
pits which were reserved for female potters, and salt deposits which were 
essential for health of herds and people. Medical knowledge was widely 
shared to such an extent that the same pharmacopoeia was used to treat 
herds of animals and human beings. The diviner-healer was a little unusual: 
a healer who was visited by the sick or victims of repeated misfortune, he 
was also the diviner that warriors would consult before embarking on a 
raid. These skills did not overly set him apart; as he was obviously paid for 
his consultations the traditional diviner-healer tended simply to be richer 
than average.
Tasks were distributed according to limits of age, generation and gender 
which in turn helped to maintain those limits. Again, one should not view 
this division as inflexible and its limits as insurmountable: within the 
sphere of economic activity, practical reason and the demands of everyday 
life took precedence. Beekeeping (and mead) and hunting were reserved 
Anne-Marie Peatrik
358
for men, while pottery and making beer were reserved for women. The 
domestic economy relied largely on the contributions of children and young 
people. And when they grew older, leaving the family homestead to become 
warriors and join the warrior class, or to marry into another homestead, 
was delayed for as long as possible. Adults worked in the gardens and 
with the herd for as long as they had the strength. The most common mix 
of activities was agriculture and animal husbandry, to varying degrees 
depending on time and space. Some non-farmers combined blacksmithing, 
breeding and foraging. Everyone, including those who had a small number 
of herds or no longer had any, loved and idealised cattle, which were seen 
as the very best way to conduct contractual relations between humans, 
as well as offerings and sacrifices to the deity: called by different names 
according to the language, this principle, around which the world would 
come to be based, was universally recognised by these peoples.
One final aspect relating to exchange and movement deserves further 
explanation. The idea that these peoples were isolated and inward-looking, 
that they were self-sufficient, in line with the stereotype that has been 
so prevalent in relation to these “primitive” precolonial people, is not 
appropriate. People moved around East African areas quite freely with 
almost no insurmountable obstacles, with only a need to know routes and 
take precautions. Over the centuries, networks were created, undone and 
rebuilt. Bartering was in operation across short or long distances: it was 
practised within domestic markets by people living short distances away, 
between producers of goods grown on higher and lower ground (cereals in 
exchange for bananas, roots and beans, and agricultural products for small 
cattle or iron objects). It was also practised between neighbouring people: 
women would go on trading expeditions under the protection of warriors, 
carrying bags of various goods—grains and cereals—on their backs, which 
they would trade for skins which were abundant among pastoralists. 
Conversely, pastoralists went up to markets at high altitudes in search of 
agricultural products, iron objects etc, which they traded for cattle.
There was no money, in the strict sense of the term, hence the concept 
of barter, but exchange values existed, which were determined from place 
to place and according to the seasons. A plausible value attributed to cattle 
was used as a focal point which varied according to the quality of the 
animals. A certain number of bags of grain were traded for iron tools; herds 
of small cattle for bananas or even large cattle, cows, heifers, calves, bulls, 
oxen, both fat and scrawny; and salt cakes for bags of yams. Blue or cowry 
shell pearls were given in exchange for cereals or herds of cattle… These 
transactions took place alongside other forms of trade and debt such as 
cattle contracts, marriage contracts and child fostering. These oral contracts, 
sealed in various ways (animal sacrifices and blood pacts together with the 
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threat of curses and retaliation in cases of non-compliance) were based 
on interpersonal relationships and mutually recognised contacts. Thus, the 
names of categories relating to generation and age, by means of comparing 
lists specific to each group of people, very often made it possible for people 
to locate any given person they had met in passing. Here, as elsewhere, 
people could break their word, or break a contract but these interactions 
would involve nearby or distant communities. Trading networks of widely 
varied kinds interconnected these peoples and communities. Distances 
beyond the reach of a trumpet call were given a value according to the 
number of days of walking, for the warriors in particular, one of whose 
main functions was to survey the country—theirs and others’—sometimes 
with hostile intentions. It was usually women who would carry things 
over shorter distances. Processions of men would cross each other while 
travelling longer distances. The tsetse fly limited the use of donkeys almost 
everywhere; and dromedaries roamed the more arid Northern regions.
These areas had relatively gentle terrain and were outward-looking. 
Various products were introduced: cowry shells, coloured pearls, blue 
Persian pearls in particular, new species and varieties to farm, which 
were adopted and adapted according to soil cultivation, transforming 
and improving them: American or South Asian species (beans, bananas, 
taro, sugar cane…) that arrived via the Nile basin and the coasts, which 
facilitated the development of more elevated land and allowed for new 
economic combinations and an increase in population. Products were 
transported to the coast of the Indian Ocean where coastal societies had 
been formed, long before the so-called Swahili cities appeared, this time 
in collaboration with well-established Arab-Muslim traders. For a long 
time products from highland blacksmiths were exported. Cattle were 
also brought to the coast. Valuable goods such as rhinoceros horns and 
elephant tusks arrived through the Kamba and other people too, who had 
established themselves as essential intermediaries. Lastly, contrary to what 
happened in the hinterland of what was to become Tanzania, Swahili and 
Arab merchants’ caravans did not penetrate, or not to a large degree, the 
continent in the hinterland of today’s Kenya. The people who lived there 
had a reputation for being “savage” and barbaric and for being protected by 
cruel warriors, a reputation that the Kamba were careful not to dispute, all 
the more so since the fate that met Swahili or Somali caravans that never 
returned confirmed this.
In this ancient economy, being rich and accumulating wealth were by 
no means held in contempt. The rich man, one who was successful in 
his various occupations, was an important person who was constantly 
called upon: he was “the one who makes people happy,” according to the 
literal meaning of one of the local names for these “big men.” He became 
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someone who provided benefits and was a resource for his citizens. He 
could not avoid the demands that were made of him as they went along 
with his reputation and position, which were determined by the number 
of “dependants” and by his ability to widen his networks. After a while, 
however, the accumulation and transfer of wealth were doomed to fail. 
Despite people’s proven expertise in conservation, any potential surplus 
from harvests could not easily be stored for long periods. Herds, despite 
being spread out across different areas, just as people lived in scattered 
settlements, remained exposed to epidemics or raids.
In short, the primitive accumulation of capital, so dear to economists, was 
not possible. It was the accumulation of people that mattered. The ability to 
overcome food or political crises, or increased mortality, was what set apart 
groups or individuals: this is one of the merits of having a range of activities, 
along with the possibility of having a sufficiently large and versatile area 
of land. Raids also made it possible to quickly recover what was needed 
to survive and start again: raids were carried out to seize cattle, or take 
captive—women and children who were taken and integrated to replenish 
the workforce. But it was important not to set off a cycle of retaliatory 
attacks. The use of raids had to be contained, otherwise widespread war 
would set in, something which had obviously happened in the past,8 but 
not to the point of causing lasting depopulation. We must adopt another 
point of view in order to understand that these peoples and their modes of 
organisation created the possibility of another form of accumulation, one 
which resulted in increased population density.
3. Peoples and Speakers
These versatile highlands were conducive to human settlements, provided 
the settlers were equipped to benefit from them and enjoyed a lower 
prevalence of disease. The varied economic activity mentioned above is the 
result of a complex process spanning centuries and millennia. Unlike many 
underpopulated or depopulated areas of pre-colonial Africa, these regions 
appeared to the conquerors to be “bastions of population” (or densely 
populated highlands) according to the classical expression used by French 
geographers: high undulating plateaus of the lacustrine kingdoms to the 
west, highlands and peaks towards the Indian Ocean, Mount Elgon, Mount 
Kenya; in Tanzania, Mount Meru and Kilimanjaro and other regions with 
8. The least well-known example is that of the internal Maasai wars which 
devastated these peoples at the end of the nineteenth century after their 
herds were destroyed by rinderpest (not to mention the drought and small pox 
epidemic which affected all populations in these regions), which again puts into 
question the risk they would have taken and the choice they would have made 
to undertake only one kind of activity.
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bimodal rainfall; to the north, beyond the semi-arid Turkana Basin, uplands 
which spring up again in Ethiopia.
Various peoples slowly moved into these areas, in search of hunting 
ground and places to fish, seeking new pastures to keep pace with new crops 
and slow but definite demographic growth. The existence of three major 
linguistic families—Cushitic, Bantu and Nilotic—in the present day attests 
to this, even if it is difficult to piece together the history of how they spread 
and mixed together.9 Whilst some can be seen to predominate, the mixing 
of populations is nonetheless active and dates back a long time. A number 
of terms pertaining to ancient political institutions are commonly used, 
demonstrating the melting-pot effect that some of them had and points to 
them having been actively used in the past. Some Bantu speakers gradually 
mixed with proto-Nilotic speakers and/or proto-Cushitic speakers, which, 
little by little, were “Bantu-ised,” a mixture which is probably at the root of 
so-called oriental Bantu languages (around Kenya’s Central Province) and 
differs from other branches of Bantu speakers. In the same way, Nilotic 
speakers—aside from the very staggered arrivals from South Sudan—can be 
separated into southern Nilotic speakers who arrived long ago and whose 
language borrows considerably from Cushitic languages (Nandi, Kipsisgis, 
Tugen, Pokot, Okiek…), eastern Nilotic speakers who arrived more recently 
(Samburu, Maasai, Turkana) and most recently, western Nilotic speakers 
(Luo). All groups, however, mixed with other pre-existing groups.
Beyond the differences in languages or their division into different 
dialects, the modes of existence of the various families of speakers remained 
very similar. Human settlements became permanent, and attracted and 
integrated other migrants. The warmer, lower areas which were suitable 
for grazing and cereal but exposed to recurrent droughts could be easily 
abandoned simply by moving to higher ground and settling on higher and 
better resourced slopes. Over the centuries, many territorial communities 
organised themselves according to slopes by combining diverse soils and 
grasslands on higher and lower ground. If groups differed from each other, 
due to distances that were too far to travel, close ties were forged between 
highland and lowland societies, which were sanctioned by various rituals. 
In the west of Kenya, we can refer to the famous case of the Luo, Nilotic 
speakers and agropastoralist fisherman who came from South Sudan as 
their herds were displaced and they mixed with pre-existing populations; 
by settling on the eastern shores of Lake Nyanza-Victoria, an area rich in 
resources, they forged strong links with the Gusii, communities of farmers 
and breeders who were established on the hills to the east. The Gusii, Bantu 
9. All the more so since the current speakers are the last recorded; their 
presence in no way rules out other families of speakers having existed and then 
disappeared without leaving easily detectable traces (Philippson 2009).
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speakers who had lived on these highlands for many years, were themselves 
a product of mixing with proto-Nilotic speakers who long preceded them.
This settlement process was made all the more likely to happen when a 
significant resource made the area at the bottom of the slopes an initial focal 
point, which led to a pioneer front heading upstream: salt deposits, surface 
iron, quality clay and wells that were easy to dig. Long-term settlement at 
the water’s edge was avoided due to exposure to the tsetse fly. Ithanga, a 
clay deposit at the southern foot of Mount Kenya, was probably the basis 
for a settlement of people that became long after the Kikuyu. Blacksmiths 
in what became Mbeere set up permanent populations, then expanded to 
higher ground, eventually becoming the Embu. To the northeast of the 
Nyambene Hills, Ngombe—a crater lake rich in salt and minerals and a 
source of vitality for humans and herds—agglomerated, in association with 
sites controlled by blacksmiths, one of the centres of populations that much 
later became the Igembe and Tigania (Meru). In southwest Kenya, beneath 
the Loita Hills, farmers and breeders settled around foothill springs, and 
became known as the Loita Maasai; these people married within groups 
of farmers, the most well-known example being the Kikuyu, among whom 
mothers and fathers are of Maasai descent and two traditions of initiation 
co-existed (the Maasai tradition and Kikuyu tradition).
More widely, any eminence that provided two rainy seasons and a 
defensive ridge was able to attract permanent populations: the Taita 
settled on the mountains of the same name, behind the Swahili coast; to 
the northwest, if it benefitted them to roam the dry lowlands, the Kamba 
would often settle on any of the hills that were dotted around towards 
Mount Kenya and make them their territory. As a counterexample, the 
people who eventually became the Turkana worthy of note. They had 
very good reasons for leaving the highlands of the Karimojong peoples 
from the sixteenth century onwards and scattering across the semi-desert 
foothills. In short, the exception that proves the rule is that settling on 
higher ground while taking control of lower slopes and foothills is the 
winning combination. And tracing the movements of ancient populations 
and human settlements requires detailed knowledge of the geographical 
frameworks and ecological potential of the areas concerned, which are 
themselves unstable.
One final subject deserves clarification: the scattered settlements that 
characterise these regions and go far beyond Kenya. This is something 
which is difficult to explain. The “villagisation” imposed on the Kikuyu 
and on some of the Embu and Meru during the 1950s under the state of 
emergency and anti-Mau Mau repression conversely reveals how prevalent 
this custom was. It is reminiscent of the contrast between bocage (a French 
word designating a landscape of hedges and settlements scattered across 
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hamlets) and open field (settlements grouped together in villages) which have 
long been observed in the West, along with the stream of analysis it elicited; 
or closer to the world of Africa, in Cameroon, the enduring controversy 
around the Bamileke bocage and its scattered settlements. The scattering 
of settlements as a way of meeting the need to develop diverse ecosystems, 
within secure areas, is the simplest explanation that can be provided within 
the scope of this article. Especially since as family settlements appeared 
along the slopes and on the preferred land situated at 1,700 metres (roughly), 
there was a custom of congregating for various purposes: the promotion of 
warriors who were placed in kind of warriors barracks in strategic places; 
processions of novices and newly initiated members travelled across the 
land reasserting its boundaries; occasional meetings in public grounds, 
barter markets, assemblies for Fathers of the Country and at a different 
location, assemblies of women. When the time came, these localities, often 
used day to day as communal pastureland, were transformed into dedicated 
or sacred areas by means of sacrifices and suitable invocations, which brings 
us straight on to political and religious structures.
4. East African Government and Politics of the Past
The highlands of today’s Kenya, like those of the border regions of 
neighbouring states, were known for an original form of social and 
political organisation, a kind of polity based on class systems relating to 
generation and age.10 Within the polities in question, each put in place by 
its own traditional generational class system and identifiable through a 
specific list of names, the population, primarily the males, were included in 
generational classes of people who exercised power in turn. If a man was in 
class “A,” his sons would be in class “B,” his grandsons in class “C,” etc. When 
there was a transfer of power from an aging generation to the successive 
younger generation, the other classes would also change position. In this 
often antagonistic phase of reordering positions (particularly in connection 
to the variable number of individuals who were born too early or too 
late relative to the time when their class came into power), names which 
were provisional then permanent were collectively chosen for the newly 
promoted classes. Another characteristic was that the manner in which 
power was transferred varied considerably from one polity to another: 
partial transfers occurred every eight years (Borana), every 15 to 20 years 
(Meru, Samburu, Maasai, Nandi, Kipsigis, Pokot, Gabbra, Dassanatch…), or 
10. “Polity” in the sense of a political entity characterised by individual socio-
political institutions: here there are generational systems, elsewhere there could 
be chiefdoms, kingdoms, empires, city-states, the latter of which can be found 
on the so-called Swahili coast, and there are as many different kinds of polity. 
However, some of their characteristics can be combined to a certain extent. 
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the transfer took place every 30 to 40 years (Kikuyu, Karimojong peoples, 
Giriama…).11
These variations reflect tensions relating to reproduction within 
traditional generations and to the specific methods by which classes were 
recruited, such as by organising rituals, by controlling, mostly successfully, 
the time at which people married or through the practice of polygamy; 
but the methods and ethos through which power was exercised were very 
similar. The ruling class of men, or Fathers of the Country, had authority 
through assemblies which would meet in public grounds: the fathers 
debated public affairs, judged the cases put before them, modified traditions 
if necessary, such as altering the “bride price” (see note 3) when it tended 
towards increasing too much. It was their particular responsibility to keep 
control of the class of young men from which their own sons were often 
recruited, and who made up the official warrior class. When the warriors 
came of age and expressed the desire to establish themselves as fathers of 
families, then a new group of warriors had to be promoted, even if it meant 
putting pressure on Fathers of the Country who were ageing but reluctant 
to accept being replaced by new fathers of the Country.
Life was often broken up into clearly defined stages, i.e. age grades or age 
status, in which rights and responsibilities were set out, and which had to be 
reached either on a personal basis or, more often, together with one’s own 
age and/or generation class. The initiation process to become a warrior was 
a crucial step for men. Warriors—the Maasai morans provide an example 
made popular by tourism—carried out offensive or defensive raids, bringing 
back herds taken from enemies; we have also mentioned that women and 
children were taken captive and integrated through initiations to boost 
the numbers among populations which were deemed insufficient; there 
was no slave trading or slave status. However, the Fathers of the Country 
took care to reign in the warriors’ aggressive zeal. They feared retaliation 
from neighbouring polities, who could very often put together armies of 
warriors who were capable of similar attacks. This allows us to understand 
the importance of the link between warriors, territory and Fathers of the 
Country which was the foundation of each polity: it is not inappropriate 
to talk in terms of “territorial sovereignty” and, in the case of the fathers, 
11. On this huge topic of social and political anthropology, see, among others: 
Baxter & Almagor 1978; Bernardi 1985; Legesse 2006; Marmone 2017; Muriuki 
1974; Peatrik 1995, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2019; Tornay 1995, 2001; Spencer 1973; 
Stewart 1977. These political organisations have presented particular challenges 
in terms of description and analysis. The overview being offered is a (condensed) 
response to the key question the purpose of these forms of society which have 
become prevalent in these regions of East Africa, and the twofold question of 
their historicity or historical depth, and their historical bearing on East Africa. 
Beyond its Whitewashed Past, the Unique Peoples of Precolonial Kenya
365
of “collective sovereign.” Even when travelling, or indeed migrating, each 
person belonging to an age or generation class remained a member of that 
class and a citizen of that polity, even if they did not live there. That is 
unless people left, in cases of a crisis or a disagreement with their fathers 
and along with fellow dissenters. They would leave to try to create their 
own polity under the pretext of seeking new pastures, often taking groups 
of girls with them as accomplices.
Over the centuries, some polities disappeared and others were formed, 
bringing together the populations of defunct polities. This simple and 
effective form of government which was self-referential or even self-
established but not free of intrinsic tensions and reproductive crises, was 
based around it being possible to quickly get institutions moving again 
after the inevitable disasters which leave their mark on human societies: 
human and animal epidemics, environmental problems, small-scale wars 
that descend into full-scale conflict, for example, as previously mentioned 
in note 8, the conflicts and disasters that struck East Africa at the end of 
the nineteenth century and helped pave the way for the colonial conquest 
by justifying it. By putting a group of self-appointed Fathers of the Country 
on one side and their sons who were in charge of defence on the other, a 
territory was established and social life could get back to being less chaotic; 
later, initiation sessions and ritual processions would strengthen the 
collectives and reinforce ties to the newly established territory. There was 
no chief here, no dynasty descending from a founding hero. Rather there 
were groups of men who shared the same traditional ethos, remarkable 
individuals who were also able to influence others, who were determined 
to work together to set up their own society.
These political systems, with their collective authority and shared 
power, were egalitarian. These societies were not very hierarchical and 
fostered an individualism which was unconnected to modernity and drew 
upon a farming ethos and pastoralist practices. There was little hierarchy 
because all young people, who at one time were subordinate, were called 
upon to become Fathers of the Country. The order of birth was almost 
unimportant in these matters, and the idea of differential roles and status 
depending on who is first born, second born… or last born, as is typically 
seen in the lineage societies well-known within African Studies, have no 
real relevance. We are looking at a different African paradigm. Everyone, 
provided they lived long enough, would cross the age thresholds along 
with their class and take on various roles relating to family, politics and 
ritual. With everyone potentially in the same boat, this system valued the 
achievements of each person, creating and also legitimising the idea that 
some people (men and woman) were more successful than others.
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These democracies of yesteryear were also capable of amalgamating 
relatively large populations through generation and age classes: it can be 
estimated that the numbers ranged from 20,000 to 90,000 inhabitants. Under 
20,000, it was no longer possible to line up sufficient numbers of warriors 
and a polity whose existence was under threat risked having to merge 
with its neighbours. Above 90,000, the distances needing to be crossed 
became too long but sometimes neighbouring polities would join together 
on the basis of jointly organised initiations. These grand rituals were a 
focus for the populations and enemies were sometimes tempted to attack 
groups while they were busy recruiting a new class of warriors. Historical-
mythical accounts explain this clearly and help us understand how, step by 
step, territorial sections grouped together in larger areas which were made 
peaceful through co-initiation. We discover the capacity of collective rites 
of passage to integrate, as well as their importance in governance, forming 
assemblies and controlling peace and war in any given territory. In this way, 
these polities were able to control sufficiently large territories within which 
anyone considered a member of the polity, or even as its ally, could move 
around. The adaptive advantage these territories displayed has already 
been mentioned. These polities were not defined by borders in the Western 
sense of the term, but by boundary areas which were identified by different 
notable ground features, very often considered “consecrated” sites where 
sacrifices were made during initiation processions which crossed the length 
of the territory. Lastly, the citizens of each of the polities could be identified 
through a common list of class names (relating to generation and age). This 
identification was a preliminary part of meetings and meant that everyone 
could find their bearings and move around far from their respective bases.
Without going into too much detail, it should be noted that women 
were included in the system through classes of wives who were named and 
associated with their husbands’ generation classes; they usually had their 
own councils and deliberated matters that concerned them, and remarkable 
women emerged from this. Rules of kinship, in terms of children and 
marriage, as well as how quickly people married and prohibitions within 
marriage, were often regulated by the system of generational and age 
classes. A man could not have sexual relations with a woman who was 
the daughter of a man of the same generation as him, or even marry that 
woman. That would amount to him marrying his own daughter, and for 
a girl to accept the advances of a man considered as her father was taboo 
and a form of incest, in this case generational, in addition to the more well 
know taboo of family incest.
In these polities there was therefore no chiefdom or dynasty; the principle 
of hereditary succession in a lineage within a predominant clan could even 
be said to contradict the principle of replacing a class of aging fathers with 
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the consecutive class of sons. The colonial administration, in the beginning, 
evidently concluded that these populations devoid of centralised power had 
no government—“anarchic” was the word used to describe these “archaic” 
indigenous people—until the most astute among them, including district 
commissioner Harold E. Lambert, realised the complexity of the traditional 
systems, their capacity for integration and the principles of devolving 
authority. These principles—elicited by Jomo Kenyatta (1938) in his 
pioneering monograph on the Kikuyu—were at the root of the resistance 
fought by Africans, who then became colonial subjects, even after their 
generation class system had been disrupted by the conquest.
It is telling that in terms of regional distribution, these political regimes 
disappear in places where, for reasons relating to geography and historical 
heritage, other regimes asserted themselves. If you head west towards 
the Great Lakes region, you find kingdoms that deeply fascinated the 
British such as the Baganda and their kabaka which was not dissimilar 
to their own monarch. This affirmation of dynasty goes hand in hand 
with the increasing importance of lineage based on proven filiation and 
the ancestralisation of some of the deceased. To the south, towards what 
is today Tanzania, chiefdoms were formed when chiefs managed, to the 
detriment of the Fathers of the Country, to sustainably manage the process 
of initiating and training the warrior class which they would use to their 
own advantage (Chagga, Rwa). To the north, towards Ethiopia, peoples 
with a generational class system like the famous Oromo gadaa system, 
after having conquered the southern half of the Ethiopian plateaus, became 
principalities before later being absorbed into Menelik II’s empire at the 
end of the nineteenth  century. Towards the coast of the Indian Ocean, 
there is good reason to think that the Swahili cities are the result of the 
transformation of local societies probably organised in the remote past 
according to classes of generation and age, similar to the system which 
remains in the Comoros archipelago. Generation and age systems of East 
African origin, as evidenced by a common vocabulary and principles 
continued to exist there while they were transformed by the influence of 
traders, then by Arab-Muslim principalities. This situation is indicative 
of ancient links between the continent and the archipelago which have 
recently been picked up by historians.
5. The Religion of Initiation
East African peoples, with their generation and age-based systems, had little 
interest in stories about the origins of the world, cosmogony or the genesis 
of the beings who came to populate it. A different conceptual and symbolic 
framework prevailed and other themes informed the stories and legends 
that they liked to tell. The world was considered to be originated from an 
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abstract power seen as working continuously for its self-maintenance. This 
abstract, energising power was regarded as a kind of deity called Ngaï, 
Murungu, Akuj, Waaka… depending on the language. It could be felt in the 
air people and animals breathed, in the wind that makes the leaves rustle 
and the water ripple; and also in reproductive substances, in the seminal 
reproductive forces of men and bulls, forces of germination seen in harvests 
and the fertilising forces of saliva mixed with mead. The world’s ills and 
misfortunes were a result of human misconduct which disturbed exchange 
and balance; and rituals, prayers and sacrifices to the deity or higher power 
aimed to redress this balance and restore proper flow and exchanges.
Ritual activities were of great importance in the life of these populations. 
The household economy, besides everyday food provision, was a way for 
the head of the family and his wives to fulfil their ritual obligations in 
a dignified manner by providing what was needed in order for them to 
take place, and by feeding the largest possible number of spectators. Paul 
Baxter, ethnographer of the Boran, even maintained that these populations 
lived in a sea of rituals and blessings, also implying that it was difficult to 
separate activities that could be classed as rituals from those that were part 
of everyday life.
In order to really characterise the religion of these East African worlds, 
we have to talk of a religion of initiation, and relate it to the link between the 
initiator and the initiated, as with the worship of ancestors, which relates to 
lineage—and has long been identified by religious studies—or, more recently, 
outside of Africa, the principle of the shaman and the shamanic journey to 
the spirit world. Nowhere else, in fact, have initiation and rites of passage, 
biographical and political, taken on such importance: rites of passage that 
mark a person’s life from birth until death, and the collective rite of passage 
when a new class of fathers comes to power, causing all the other classes 
to change position. The organisation of rituals legitimised the political; and 
generally speaking the effect of a rite was not only symbolic or magical, it 
had a practical effect that changed people in concrete ways, reconfiguring 
social ties and social precedence. Some rites were modest procedures, 
almost surreptitious but no less significant, such as the first shaving of a 
child’s hair which was carried out long after they were born, within the 
family homestead, at a time when it was sure that they would survive. The 
child would then receive a name, the first of several during his existence, 
which would be that of a grandparent of the same sex. This grand-parent, 
through the gift of his or her name and the principle of the identity of the 
alternating generations, was thus granted a kind of longevity. Other rituals 
such as the initiation to promote someone to warrior status—some involved 
circumcision but many other initiatory ritual procedures existed—could 
take place over the course of a year. Various groups of the population would 
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perform as part of a true spectacle with the initiation process starting only 
when the granaries were full, the herds were well fed and there had been 
peace for a sufficiently long time; these ritual gatherings or co-initiations 
helped to incorporate groups into larger collectives, as mentioned above.
In accordance with the egalitarianism of the political and social system, 
no religious leader was responsible for conducting the rituals but some 
dignitaries sometimes worked in conjunction with the Fathers and the 
“Accomplished.” A person’s intangible and spiritual capacity to influence 
the course of life depended firstly on having the power to bless, and also to 
curse. Every person potentially had this gift but the effectiveness of their 
power depended on the person’s age status and reputation as an individual. 
The blessings of those who had reached the last age grade were particularly 
effective and sought after: having succeeded in overcoming all the crises 
of existence, these “Accomplished” men and women were considered to be 
closest to the Deity, if not as part of it. In some polities, certain figures were 
known for having a particular aptitude for giving blessings, such as the 
mûgwe among the Meru, whose blessings using the left hand were beneficial 
and sought after. Outside the setting of rituals, nothing really distinguished 
them from their fellow citizens. These specific dignitaries simply honed 
their particular skills which it was useful to draw upon during times of 
excessive or insufficient rain, among other examples, in an eclipse or even 
when an epidemic indicated a disturbance in the cycles of rain and sun 
(Bernardi 1959; Legesse 1979; Waller 1995; Wood 1999).
The requests for protection that these figures or the Accomplished 
persons would address to the Deity, their benevolent words interspersed 
with jets of saliva mixed with mead, the rubbing of clay or fat on to certain 
parts of the body—all their actions were very effective and the presence 
of the Accomplished men and women was essential during the many 
rituals that marked age-grading and the progress of generation classes. The 
opposite and complementary practice of cursing, in which menacing words 
were publicly declared interspersed with saliva projected from the top 
teeth, was available to everyone; but again, its effectiveness corresponded 
to the age of the speaker, and cursing was a powerful instrument of social 
control not be used lightly. Among certain peoples, a curse was irreversible 
(the Maasai for example) while for others, it was possible for it to be lifted 
after a certain length of time, when the speaker of the curse had come to 
accept the request put forward by the person being cursed. Reconciliation 
took place through a ritual based around the sacrifice of a particular animal 
followed by the sharing of the carcass which was eaten immediately. 
Blessings and curses forged links between the living and, in some cases, 
the recently deceased whose word had not been respected and who people 
tried to appease through sharing a sacrificed animal (Peatrik 1991).
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Since they were publicly announced, blessings and curses were known 
to everyone, and were everyone’s responsibility, unlike attacks through 
witchcraft which were thought to be secret acts by certain wicked people 
who spoke evil words to themselves, buried certain objects that were 
considered dangerous in specific places and slipped poison into the food 
of those they wanted to harm. A source of fear and anxiety, rumours of 
witchcraft constituted a serious disruption to public order. The individuals 
accused were judged by councils of fathers and subjected to ordeals, 
and the guilty were condemned to death and executed, only after being 
subjected to torture and enduring “exemplary” suffering. The work of the 
assembly of fathers was broader as they decided on the ritual procedures to 
be performed when misfortune and hardship repeatedly struck the polity: 
excess water or drought, epidemic and increased mortality… there was a 
complete sacrificial process which included the dignitaries mentioned 
above and aimed to restore balance to the cycles of rain and sun. Sometimes 
even disturbances in the atmosphere indicated that the time had come to 
renew the social and political body, to urge the older generation to depart 
and bring in a new class of Fathers of the Country. Ideally, aging and 
rejuvenation would be a part of the way in which institutions kept going: 
individuals would come and go but the polity, distinguished by its list of 
names of generations, would remain.
It fell to the diviner-healer to deal with individual and family troubles 
and find the causes (Fratkin 2011). He would examine the entrails of 
a goat which was sacrificed for this purpose or the diagrams drawn by 
the tiny objects projecting from his divination gourd. There was a wide 
range of causes of unhappiness which could involve family or community 
networks. Misfortune or illness could result from accidentally or 
deliberately committing a forbidden act considered particularly improper, 
from insufficient blessings or intentional curses, or from witchcraft. Again, 
making amends meant sacrificing an animal from the herd, with the 
procedures varying according to the type of animal: its age, sex, the colour 
of its coat, the method of killing and the way the carcass was used, whether 
it was shared or completely destroyed. Other methods of treating diseases 
existed such as herbal medicine and initiation into therapeutic associations, 
but the use and the sacrifice of animals from the herd, even if it was only a 
few goats’ heads, remained the quintessential way of carrying out acts of 
reparation.
Funeral rituals were strictly a family matter, involving no public display, 
and differed according to the age of the deceased. This was in accordance 
with an indifference to the idea of individual post-mortem existence 
besides grandchildren, but not to a collective existence after death since 
bringing back the names of old generational classes made sure of this. 
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Everything was thought to take place during a person’s lifetime which 
accounts for the high value placed on initiations and the final stage of 
accomplishment. Protocols were similar from group to group, with some 
variations. Therefore, the deaths of people who died before this stage 
had been completed were considered tragic and their remains were left 
in the bush for predators; in contrast, the remains of the Accomplished 
which sometimes dried out quickly due to fires that were kept going day 
and night, were buried and considered beneficial to the ground in the pit 
where the herd’s droppings were collected. And as is logical, if one looks 
outside the area where systems relating to age and generation predominate, 
one comes across ways of worshipping ancestors, well-formed lineages, 
rules of inheritance for widows, recognisable funeral rites—in short, all 
the workings of other ritual-social societies, for example of the Luo or the 
Luyia. However, social hierarchies, despite having different features, were 
not expressed and were characterised by the same high value placed on the 
herd and the same central importance of cows.
In light of this picture of East African and Kenyan worlds before they 
were transformed by the colonial conquest, then by decolonisation, there is 
clearly food for thought and a case for imagining a new national museum 
of Kenyan ethnography and history, which could make use of multimedia 
collections and resources in ways not seen before. The emphasis could 
be on processes and dynamics—technological, organisational, ritual—, on 
variations of scale which highlight specific geographical and historical 
features, on biographies, not of kings but of figures who have left a wealth 
of material in collections of oral sources, which could make up a highly 
original gallery of portraits. The historical depth of these phenomena—
even if we only partially know about it—, could be enhanced and conveyed 
through synoptic tables displaying the different methods—those used by 
archaeologists differing from those of linguists for example—and separating 
likely or plausible dates from proven dates, with this being modified as and 
when there are advances in knowledge. The display would also need to 
show the mixture of both what is permanent and the profound changes that 
makes up the real Kenya: a variety of languages but a homogeneity in terms 
of economic conditions; environmental contrasts and conflict relating to 
land use but also ancient trading systems and the active circulation of 
goods; societies with collective power, forms of territorial sovereignty, 
forms of individualism, not without their parallels with contemporary 
political processes. Age-grading and learning through initiations echo the 
schooling which Kenyans have championed, as well as the readiness for 
hard work and the value placed on individual achievement which, in the 
early days, fuelled for example the energy of Kenyan runners… Beyond 
the undeniable rupture that the colonial conquest represented, now that 
Anne-Marie Peatrik
372
a sufficient number of years have passed since decolonisation, we have a 
better sense of the way in which Kenya is a product of these legacies. In a 
nation that sometimes doubts itself, we can allow ourselves to think that 
perhaps becoming (re)acquainted with a shared past, with all its rough edges 
and differences and not just made “heritage,” would allow for a clearer look 
ahead to a shared future; perhaps the use of critical and reflexive knowledge 
of the past and identities is not incompatible with nation building, in fact 
quite the opposite.
Conclusion
Broadly speaking, the subject of Kenya as presented in this article is an 
invitation to further research which will be set out by way of a conclusion. 
When considered alongside other situations in Africa and elsewhere, 
it could provide the basis for a comparison incorporating two starting 
points: the status of customs and nation-building. Thus, in analysing the 
“folklorisation” process that popular customs underwent following the 
French Revolution, which accompanied the advent of the industrial world 
and modern nation-states, it is revealed that customs were subject to a double 
transformation at the very moment that they were destined to disappear. 
They were regionalised and folkorised, even inspiring regionalist literature 
and became knowledge objects for the first methodical ethnographic 
surveys which were designed to rescue them before they died out (Fabre 
1996; Thiesse 1999).
African states, beyond some common dysfunction analysed by political 
scientists, display great diversity. Concerning East Africa only, how can we 
keep thinking of the institutions of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania 
as fitting into the same mould, as if the distinctive features of their ante-
colonial circumstances have had no effect on their modes of existence? 
Kenya, with its unique configuration, appears to be permanently influenced 
by the generational polities which once prevailed across a large part of 
its territory. However, these old political systems—still partly in existence 
in the northern counties of Kenya—as well as inviting us to look beyond 
the idea that a state-based society and a stateless society are opposed to 
one another,12 have to do with the practical values and methods that have 
permeated the various emancipation movements and remained within 
contemporary practices. Thus, there exists a continuity, one which is 
often underestimated and misunderstood, between territorial sovereignty 
(Mbembe 2005) and the ethos of these ancient democracies, on the one 
12. This opposition seen in the first major study of African political systems 
(Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940) should not be jettisoned but rather qualified, 
amended or built upon, drawing upon the great number of monographs which 
have been produced in different regions of Africa since this pioneering work.
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hand, and modern democracies, on the other. The current situation of 
cultures in Kenya is best clarified in a different way. The “heritagisation” in 
progress could be less indicative of a whitewashed past, instead displaying 
an awareness of a past which is in the process of becoming the past, and of 
customs disappearing. In a kind of dialectic movement being passed down 
through successive generations, the folklorisation called for in most Kenyan 
counties could serve as a prelude to distancing from the societies and 
cultures of yesteryear, and to the sustainable13 development of systematic 
knowledge, this being the task that lies ahead for the future of history in 
tomorrow’s Kenya.
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